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Abstract—In this paper, we apply machine learning to dis-
tributed private data owned by multiple data owners, entities
with access to non-overlapping training datasets. We use noisy,
differentially-private gradients to minimize the fitness cost of the
machine learning model using stochastic gradient descent. We
quantify the quality of the trained model, using the fitness cost,
as a function of privacy budget and size of the distributed datasets
to capture the trade-off between privacy and utility in machine
learning. This way, we can predict the outcome of collaboration
among privacy-aware data owners prior to executing poten-
tially computationally-expensive machine learning algorithms.
Particularly, we show that the difference between the fitness of
the trained machine learning model using differentially-private
gradient queries and the fitness of the trained machine model in
the absence of any privacy concerns is inversely proportional to
the size of the training datasets squared and the privacy budget
squared. We successfully validate the performance prediction
with the actual performance of the proposed privacy-aware
learning algorithms, applied to: financial datasets for determining
interest rates of loans using regression; and detecting credit card
frauds using support vector machines.
Index Terms—Machine learning; Differential privacy; Stochas-
tic gradient algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation and Contributions
Data analysis methods using machine learning (ML) can
unlock valuable insights for improving revenue or quality-of-
service from, potentially proprietary, private datasets. Having
large high-quality datasets improves the quality of the trained
ML models in terms of the accuracy of predictions on new,
potentially untested data. The subsequent improvements in
quality can motivate multiple data owners to share and merge
their datasets in order to create larger training datasets. For in-
stance, financial institutes may wish to merge their transaction
or lending datasets to improve the quality of trained ML mod-
els for fraud detection or computing interest rates. However,
government regulations (e.g., the roll-out of the General Data
Protection Regulation in EU, the California Consumer Privacy
Act or the development of the Data Sharing and Release
Bill in Australia) increasingly prohibit sharing customer’s data
without consent [1]. Our work here is motivated by the need to
conciliate the tension between quality improvement of trained
ML models and the privacy concerns for data sharing.
We investigate a machine learning setup in which a learner
wants to train a model based on multiple datasets from
different data owners. For the purpose of preserving privacy for
data contributors, the learner can only submit queries to data
owners and they respond by providing differentially-private
Learner
· · ·
query
D
P
response
qu
er
yD
P
re
sp
on
se
q
u
er
y
D
P
re
sp
o
n
se
Data
owner
1
Data
owner
2
Data
owner
N
Fig. 1. The communication structure between the learner and the distributed
data owners for submitting queries and providing differentially-private (DP)
responses.
(DP) responses as illustrated in Figure 1. We specifically
consider honest-but-curious threat models in which different
private data owners do not trust each other (or the central
learner) for sharing private training datasets, but trust the
learner to train the model correctly. As an example, in fi-
nancial services, a central learner, such as a central bank
or government, can be trusted for facilitating computations
among banks although they may not trust each other or the
learner for accessing private data. Another example is for smart
grid in which electricity retailers are private data owners and
the electricity market operator can facilitate learning. In this
paper, the learner submits a gradient query to each data owner.
Upon receiving DP responses from data owners to the gradient
queries, the learner adjusts the parameters of the ML model in
the direction of the average of the DP gradients. Therefore, the
quality of the DP responses (in terms of the magnitude of the
additive DP noise) from the data owners to the gradient queries
determines the performance of the ML training algorithm.
An important parameter in the ML training algorithm is
the step size, the amount by which the model parameters
are adjusted in each iteration. If the fitness cost of the ML
meets the assumptions of smoothness, strong convexity, and
Lipschitz-continuity of the gradient, we can prove that, by
selecting the step sizes to be inversely proportional with the
iteration number and inversely proportional with the maximum
number of iterations squared (see Algorithm 1 in Section II),
the difference between the fitness of the trained ML model
using DP gradient queries and the fitness of the trained ML
model in the absence of any privacy concerns becomes small.
In fact, the magnitude of the difference becomes inversely
proportional to the size of the training datasets squared and the
privacy budgets of the data owners squared; see Theorem 2 in
Section III. Several ML models and fitness costs, such as linear
and logistic regression, satisfy the above-mentioned assump-
tions. This enables us to predict the outcome of collaboration
among privacy-aware data owners and the learner in terms of
the fitness cost of the ML training model. However, if the
fitness function does not meet these assumptions, we must
select the step size to be inversely proportional to the square
root of the iteration number. This way, the step size fades away
much slower and the effect of the DP noise is more pronounced
on the iterates of the learning algorithm. Therefore, we must
add an averaging layer on top of the algorithm to reduce the
negative impact of the DP noise; see Algorithm 2 in Section II.
This is based on the developments of [2] with appropriate
changes in the averaging step to suit the ML problem with DP
gradient queries. In this case, we can prove that the difference
between the fitness of the trained ML model using DP gradient
queries and the fitness of the trained ML model in the absence
of any privacy concerns is inversely proportional to the size
of the training datasets (no longer squared) and the privacy
budget (no longer squared); see Theorem 3 in Section III.
In this paper, we focus on the case where the datasets in
possession of the private data owners in Figure 1 are mutually
exclusive or non-overlapping, i.e., two identical records are not
shared across the datasets. In many real-life applications within
the financial and energy sectors, this is a realistic assumption,
e.g, transactional records (e.g. for purchasing goods) are
unique by the virtue of timestamps, amounts, and the unique-
ness of purchases by an individual. This assumption is set in
place to ensure differential privacy using independent additive
noises. In the absence of such an assumption, there also
needs to be a privacy-preserving mechanism for identifying
those common entries without potential information leakage
regarding non-common entries, which itself is a daunting task
and open problem for research.
For experimental verification of the theoretical results, two
financial datasets are used in this paper. First, we use a
regression model on a dataset containing information on loans
made on Lending Club, a peer-to-peer lending platform [3], to
automate the process of setting interest rates of loans. Second,
we train a support vector machine for detecting fraudulent
transactions based on a dataset containing transactions made
by European credit card-holders in September 2013 [4]. We
use the experiments to validate theoretical predictions and to
gain important insights into the outcome of collaborations
among privacy-aware data owners. For instance, even if the
learner has access to one large dataset with relaxed privacy
constraints, the performance of the trained ML model can
be very bad if small conservative datasets (i.e., datasets with
very small privacy budgets) also contribute to the learning.
Therefore, it is best to exclude smaller conservative datasets
from collaboration. This is a counter-intuitive observation
as it clearly indicates that more data is not always good,
if it is obfuscated by conservative data owners. Larger, but
conservative, datasets are sometimes worth including in the
training as they do not degrade performance heavily with their
conservative privacy budgets, yet improve the performance of
the trained ML model because of their size. These observations
can be alternatively interpreted as: collaboration in training a
model with a dataset can only be useful if and only if it has
enough information (i.e., enough data entries) to suppress the
impact of random noise added for privacy guarantees.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We develop DP gradient descent algorithms for training
ML models on distributed private datasets owned by
different entities; see Algorithms 1 and 2 in Section II.
• We prove that the quality of the trained ML model
using DP gradient descent algorithm scales inversely with
privacy budgets squared, and the size of the distributed
datasets squared, which can establish a trade-off between
privacy and utility in privacy-preserving ML;
• We develop a theory that enables to predict the outcome
of a potential collaboration among privacy-aware data
owners (or data custodians) in terms of the fitness cost
of the ML training model prior to executing potentially
computationally-expensive ML algorithms on distributed
privately-owned datasets; see Theorems 2 and 3 in Sec-
tion III. The bounds in these theorems are not necessarily
optimal, i.e., there might exist better performance bounds
for other privacy-preserving learning algorithms, but, if
the data owners follow Algorithms 1 and 2, they can
predict their success or failure.
• We validate our theoretical analysis by evaluating our
differentially private ML algorithms using distributed
non-overlapping financial datasets belonging to multiple
institutes/banks for determining interest rates of loans
using regression, and for detecting credit card fraud using
support vector machine classifier; We further validate the
predictions of the analysis with the actual performance of
the proposed privacy-aware learning algorithms applied to
the distributed financial datasets; see Section IV.
• Our experimental results indicate that, in the case of three
banks collaborating to train a support vector machine
classifier to detect credit card fraud, within only 100
iterations, the fitness of the trained model using DP
gradient queries is in average within 90% of the fitness of
the trained model in the absence of privacy concern if the
privacy budget is equal to 1 and each bank has access to
a dataset of 30,000 records of credit card transactions and
their validity. We observe similar performance results for
training a regression model over interest rates of loans
with the privacy budget of 10 and datasets of 350,000
records each.
B. Related Work
ML using Secure Multi-Party Computation and Encryp-
tion. Secure multi-party computation provide avenues for se-
curing the iterations of distributed ML algorithms across mul-
tiple data owners. In the past, secure multi-party computation
has been used in various ML models, such as decision trees
[5], regression [6], association rules [7], and clustering [8],
[9]. Training ML models using encrypted data was discussed
in [10]–[14]. In [15], efficient conversion of models for use
of encrypted input data was discussed. The use of secure
multi-party computation reduces the computational efficiency
of ML algorithms by adding a non-trivial computational and
communication performance overhead.
ML with Differential Privacy. A natural way for alle-
viating privacy concerns is to deploy privacy-enabled ML
using differential privacy (DP) [16]–[19]. In [18], a privacy-
preserving regularized logistic regression algorithm is pro-
vided for learning from private databases by bounding the
sensitivity of regularized logistic regression, and perturbing
the learned classifier with noise proportional to the sensitivity.
This technique is proved to be DP and simulations are used to
investigate the trade-off between privacy and learning utility.
In [17], a large class of optimization-based DP machine
learning algorithms are developed by appropriately perturbing
the objective function of the ML training algorithm. The
mechanism is applied to linear and logistic regression models
and shown to provide high accuracy. In the mentioned studies,
privacy-preserving ML, however, often relies on an entire
dataset, constructed by merging smaller datasets, being stored
in one location. The ML model is then either trained on
the aggregated dataset, and is systematically obfuscated using
additive noise to guarantee differential privacy, or trained
on an obfuscated centrally-located data. Such methods do
not address the underlying problem that the smaller datasets
are owned by multiple entities with restrictions on sharing
sensitive data.
Distributed/Collaborative Privacy-Preserving ML. ML
based on distributed private datasets has been recently investi-
gated in, e.g., [20]–[24]. Note that this problem is intimately
related to distributed optimization using differentially-private
oracles, as such ML problems can be cast as distributed
optimization problems in which distributed training datasets
are represented within cost functions or constraints of the
entities. Using stochastic gradient descent with additive Gaus-
sian/Laplace noise to ensure DP is also common in the
literature; (e.g., [25]–[28]). In [25], noisy gradients are used
to train a deep neural network. The scale of the required
additive noise for DP is reduced in [26] by employing the
idea of moment accountant, instead of standard composition
rules. Stochastic gradient descent is also utilized in [27] for
recurrent neural network language models. Generalizations for
obfuscating individual and group-level trends by DP additive
noise are presented in [28]. Because iterative methods rely on
multiple rounds of inquiries of private datasets, for instance,
by submitting multiple gradient queries, the privacy budget
must be inversely scaled by the total number of iterations to
ensure that a reasonable privacy guarantee can be achieved
(alternatively, privacy guarantees get weaker as the number of
iterations grows because of the composition rule of differential
privacy). Hence, if the parameters of the optimization algo-
rithm are not carefully chosen, bounds on the performance of
the ML training algorithm deteriorates with an increasing total
number of iterations; e.g., see [29]. In [20], [21], the privacy
budget was kept constant and therefore by communicating
more, as the number of the iterations grows, the privacy
guarantee weakens. However, in those studies, if the privacy
budget had been scaled inversely proportional to the total
number of iterations, privacy guarantees would be maintained
over the entire horizon but performance would deteriorate with
increasing total number of iterations, as in [29].
All these studies, however, do not address the issues of
convergence of the learning algorithm, selection of appropriate
step size in the stochastic gradient descent, and forecasting of
the quality of the trained ML model based on the privacy
budget prior to running extensive potentially computationally-
expensive experiments. These missing steps are some of the
important contributions of this paper.
C. Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce
our system model and propose privacy-aware ML algorithms
with distributed private datasets in Section II. We analyze and
provide theoretical results for predicting the performance of
the privacy-preserving training algorithms in Section III. We
present the experimental results in Section IV. Finally, we
conclude the paper in Section V.
II. ML TRAINING ALGORITHM BASED ON DISTRIBUTED
PRIVATE DATA WITH DP GRADIENT QUERIES
A. Setup
Consider a group of N ∈ N private agents or data owners
N := {1, . . . , N} that are connected to a node responsible
for training a ML model, identified as a learning agent, over
an undirected communication graph as in Figure 1. Each
agent has access to a set of private training data Di :=
{(xi, yi)}nii=1 ⊆ X × Y ⊆ Rpx × Rpy , where xi and yi,
respectively, denote inputs and outputs. Each data owner,
for instance, could be a private bank/financial institution. In
this case, the private datasets can represent information about
loan applicants (such as salary, employment status, and credit
rating1) as inputs and historically approved interest rates per
annum by the bank (in percentage points) as outputs.
Assumption 1. Private datasets are mutually exclusive, i.e.,
Di ∩ Dj = ∅ for all i, j ∈ N .
Assumption 1 states that two identical records, equal in
every possible aspect, cannot be in two or more datasets. This
is a realistic assumption in many real-life applications, such as
financial and energy data. For instance, across multiple banks
and financial-service providers, transaction records (e.g. for
purchasing goods) are unique by the virtue of timestamps,
amounts, and the uniqueness of purchases for an individual. In
energy systems, one household cannot transact (for purchasing
power) with two or more energy retailers and thus its consump-
tion pattern can only be stored by one retailer. The reasons
behind this assumption are two-fold. First, to guarantee ǫ-
differential privacy, we need to ensure that the records are not
1Categorical attributes, such as gender, can always be translated into
numerical ones according to a rule.
repeated so that an adversary cannot reduce the noise levels by
averaging the reports containing information about repeated
entries and thus exceeding ǫ (due to the composition rule
for differential privacy). If the datasets had common entries,
there would need to be a privacy-preserving mechanism for
identifying those common entries without potential informa-
tion leakage with respect to non-common entries, which is
a daunting task. The mutually exclusive or non-overlapping
nature of the datasets also results in statistical independence
of additive privacy-preserving noise. This independence is
extremely useful in computing the magnitude of the addi-
tive noise for forecasting the performance of privacy-aware
learning algorithms. If records can appear in at most κ ∈
{1, . . . , N} datasets and we do not exclude the overlapping
entries during the learning, we must ensure that the gradient
queries are DP with privacy budget ǫi/κ, ∀i ∈ N . This is
to ensure that we can guarantee privacy budget ǫi for the
repeated entries across the datasets by using the composition
rule for differential privacy. This results in degradation of
the fitness of the trained ML model with privacy-preserving
algorithms. For instance, in Theorem 2, we show that the
difference between the fitness of the trained ML model using
DP gradient queries and the fitness of the trained ML model in
the absence of any privacy concerns is inversely proportional
to the size of the training datasets squared and the privacy
budget squared. Therefore, when allowing repeated entries,
the difference between the fitness of the private ML model
and the fitness of the trained machine model without privacy
concerns degrades by a factor of κ2.
The learning agent is interested in extracting a meaningful
relationship between the inputs and outputs using ML model
M : X × Rpθ → Y and the available training datasets Di,
∀i ∈ N , by solving the optimization problem in
θ∗ ∈ argmin
θ∈Θ
[
g1(θ) +
1
n
∑
j∈N
∑
{x,y}∈Dj
g2(M(x; θ), y)
]
, (1)
where g2(M(x; θ), y) is a loss function capturing the “close-
ness” of the outcome of the trained ML model M(x; θ) to the
actual output y, g1(θ) is a regularizing term, n :=
∑
ℓ∈N nℓ,
and Θ := {θ ∈ Rpθ | ‖θ‖∞ ≤ θmax}. Note that a large enough
θmax can always be selected such that the search over Θ does
not add any conservatism (in comparison to the unconstrained
case), if desired. We use f(θ) to denote the cost function of (1)
for the sake of the brevity of the presentation, i.e.,
f(θ) := g1(θ) +
1
n
∑
{x,y}∈
⋃
j∈N Dj
g2(M(x; θ), y). (2)
Remark 1 (Generality of Optimization-Based ML). In an
automated loan assessment example, a bank maybe inter-
ested in employing a linear regression model to estimate the
interest rate of the loans based on attributes of customers
(thus developing an “AI platform” for loan assessment and
delivery). A linear regression model, as the name suggests,
considers a linear relationship between input x and output y
in the form of y = M(x; θ) := θ⊤x, where θ ∈ Rpθ is the
parameter of the ML model. We can train the regression model
by solving the optimization problem (1) with g2(M(x; θ), y) =
‖y−M(x; θ)‖22, and g1(θ) = 0. In addition to linear (or non-
linear) regression discussed earlier, which clearly is of the
form in (1), several other ML algorithms follow this formula-
tion. Another example is linear support vector machines (L-
SVM). In this problem, it is desired to obtain a separating
hyper plane of the form {x ∈ Rpx : θ⊤[x⊤ 1]⊤ = 0}
with its corresponding classification rule sign(M(x; θ)) with
M(x; θ) := θ⊤[x⊤ 1]⊤ to group the training data into two sets
(corresponding to y = +1 and y = −1). This problem can
be cast as (1) with g1(θ) := (1/2)θ
⊤θ and g2(M(x; θ), y) :=
max(0, 1−M(x; θ)y). We can easily see that the extension to
non-linear SVM can also be cast as an optimization-based ML
problem. Another example is artificial neural network (ANN).
In this case, M(x; θ) describes the input-output behaviour
of the ANN with θ capturing parameters, such as internal
thresholds. This problem can be cast as (1) with g1(θ) := 0
and g2(M(x; θ), y) := ‖y −M(x; θ))‖2.
If the data owners could come to an agreement to share
private data (and it was not illegal to disclose customers’
private information without their consent), the learning agent
could train the ML model by solving the optimization prob-
lem (1) directly. In practice, however, data owners may not
be able to share their private data. In this case, the learning
agent can submit queries Qi(Di; k) ∈ Q to agent i ∈ N for
k ∈ T := {1, . . . , T }, where T denotes the number of com-
munication rounds (i.e., the number of queries) agreed upon
by all the data owners prior to the exchange of information,
index k identifies the current communication round, and Q
denotes the output space of the query. Agent i ∈ N can then
provide a differentially-private response Qi(Di; k) ∈ Q to the
query Qi(Di; k) ∈ Q.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy). The response policy of
data owner ℓ ∈ N is ǫℓ-differentially private over the horizon
T if
P
{
(Qℓ(Dℓ; k))Tk=1 ∈ Y
}
≤ exp(ǫℓ)P
{
(Qℓ(D′ℓ; k))Tk=1 ∈ Y
}
,
where Y is any Borel-measurable subset of QT , and Dℓ and
D′ℓ are two adjacent datasets differing at most in one entry,
i.e., |Dℓ \ D′ℓ| = |D′ℓ \ Dℓ| ≤ 1.
The learning agent then processes all the received responses
to the queries in order to generate its ML model:
θˆ := ς((Qj(Dj ; k))k∈T ,j∈N ),
where ς :
∏
k∈T QT → Rpθ is a mapping used by the learning
agent for fusing all the available information.
In the next subsection, we present an algorithm for gener-
ating queries, and then use the provided differentially-private
responses for computing a trained ML model.
B. Algorithm
In the absence of privacy concerns, one strategy for training
the ML model by the learning agent is to provide unfettered
access to the original private data of the data owners in
N . In this case, the learning agent can follow the projected
(sub)gradient descent iterations in
θ[k + 1] = ΠΘ[θ[k]− ρkξf (θ[k])], (3)
where ρk > 0 is the step-size at iteration k, ξf (θ[k]) is a
sub-gradient, an element of sub-differentials ∂θf(θ[k]), of the
cost function f with respect to the variable θ evaluated at
θ[k] [30], and ΠΘ[·] denotes projection operator into the set
Θ defined as ΠΘ[a] := argminb∈Θ ‖a−b‖2. For continuously
differentiable functions, the gradient is the only sub-gradient.
The use of sub-gradients, instead of gradient in this paper,
is motivated by the possible choice of non-differentiable loss
functions in ML, e.g., the cost function of the L-SVM.
Assumption 2. g1 and g2 are convex functions of θ.
Assumption 2 implies that f is also a convex function of θ.
The existence of sub-differentials is guaranteed for convex
functions [30]. We define g¯x,y2 (θ) = g2(M(x; θ), y). The
update law in (3) can be rewritten as
θ[k + 1] = ΠΘ
[
θ[k]− ρkξg1 (θ[k])
− ρk
n
∑
ℓ∈Nj
∑
{x,y}∈Dℓ
ξg¯x,y
2
(θ[k])
]
,
= ΠΘ
[
θ[k]− ρkξg1 (θ[k])
− ρk
n
∑
ℓ∈Nj\{j}
nℓQℓ(Dℓ; k)
]
, (4)
where ξg1 is a sub-gradient of g1, ξg¯x,y
2
is a sub-gradient of
g¯x,y2 , and Qℓ(Dℓ; k) is a query that can be submitted by the
learning agent to data owner ℓ ∈ N in order to provide the
aggregate sub-gradient:
Qℓ(Dℓ; k) = 1
nℓ
∑
{x,y}∈Dℓ
ξg¯x,y
2
(θ[k]). (5)
Responding to the query Qℓ(Dℓ; k) clearly intrudes on the
privacy of the individuals in dataset Dℓ. Therefore, data owner
ℓ only responds in a differentially-private manner by reporting
the noisy aggregate:
Qℓ(Dℓ; k) = Qℓ(Dℓ; k) + wℓ[k], (6)
where wℓ[k] is an additive noise to establish differential
privacy with privacy budget ǫℓ over the horizon T ; see Defini-
tion 1. As stated before, here, the horizon T is the total number
of iterations of the projected sub-gradient algorithm. Note that
each neighbour responds to one query in each iteration.
Assumption 3. Ξ := max(x,y)∈X×Y ‖ξg¯x,y
2
(θ[k])
∥∥
1
<∞.
Algorithm 1 ML training algorithm with distributed private
datasets using DP gradients for strongly-convex smooth fitness
cost.
Require: T
Ensure: (θ[k])Tk=1
1: Initialize θ[1]
2: for k = 1, . . . , T − 1 do
3: Learner submits query Qℓ(Dℓ; k) to data owners in N
4: Data owners return DP responses Qℓ(Dℓ; k)
5: Learner follows the update rule
θ[k + 1] = θ[k]− ρ
T 2k
(
ξg1(θ[k]) +
∑
ℓ∈N
nℓ
n
Qℓ(Dℓ; k)
)
,
6: end for
Assumption 3 implies the gradients or the sub-gradients of
fitness function have a bounded magnitude. For strongly con-
vexity loss functions with Lipschitz gradients, this assumption
can be satisfied. This is because, for strongly convex functions,
the decision variables, i.e., the ML model, remains within a
compact set. However, for non-strongly convex functions, we
need to restrict the ML models to the compact set Θ; see (1).
Theorem 1. The policy of data owner ℓ in (6) for respond-
ing to the queries is ǫℓ-differentially private over horizon
{1, . . . , T } if wℓ[k] are i.i.d.2 noises with the density function
p(w) =
(
1
2b
)pθ
exp
(
− ‖w‖1
b
)
with scale b = 2ΞT/(nℓǫℓ).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 states that i.i.d. Laplace additive noise can ensure
DP gradients. Each response in (6), for a given k, using the
additive noise density in Theorem 1 is (ǫℓ/T )-differentially
private. Therefore, over the whole horizon {1, . . . , T }, all
the responses meet the definition of ǫℓ-differential privacy.
This follows from the composition of T differentially-private
mechanisms [31]. In [20], [21], each response is constructed
to ensure ǫ-differential privacy, which implies that the overall
algorithm is ǫT -differentially private, thus reducing the privacy
guarantee with increasing the number of the iterations.
In the presence of the additive noise, the iterates of the
learner follow the stochastic map
θ[k + 1] = ΠΘ[θ[k]− ρk(ξf (θ[k]) + w[k])], (7)
where
w[k] :=
1
n
∑
ℓ∈N
nℓwℓ[k].
Algorithm 1 summarizes our proposed ML algorithm with
distributed private datasets using DP gradients. Note that, in
Algorithm 1, the step size, or the learning rate, decreases with
the iteration number k. This is done to reduce the influence of
2independently and identically distributed
Algorithm 2 ML algorithm with distributed private datasets
using DP sub-gradients.
Require: T , c1
Ensure: (θ[k])Tk=1
1: Initialize θ[1] within Θ
2: for k = 1, . . . , T − 1 do
3: Learner submits query Qℓ(Dℓ; k) to data owners in N
4: Data owners return DP responses Qℓ(Dℓ; k)
5: Learner follows the update rule
θ[k + 1] = ΠΘ
[
θ[k]− c1√
k
(
ξg1(θ[k])+
∑
ℓ∈N
nℓ
n
Qℓ(Dℓ; k)
)]
,
6: Learner follows the averaging rule
θ¯[k + 1] =
k − 1
1/
√
T + k
θ¯[k] +
1/
√
T + 1
1/
√
T + k
θ[k].
7: end for
the privacy-preserving additive noise in the performance of the
trained model. In the non-private training (i.e., when ǫ = +∞),
we do not need to reduce the step size with iteration number
k as there is no privacy-preserving noise. In fact, we can
select a constant learning rate to extract the non-private model;
see [32] for convergence analysis of optimization algorithms
with constant steps sizes.
In Section III, we observe that the performance of Al-
gorithm 1 can only be assessed under the assumptions of
differentiability, smoothness, and strong convexity of the fit-
ness cost. These assumptions are satisfied for several ML
models and fitness costs, such as regression. To avoid these
assumptions and to also reduce the effect of the additive noise,
we can define the averaging variable
θ¯[k + 1] =
(
1− 1/
√
T + 1
1/
√
T + k
)
θ¯[k] +
1/
√
T + 1
1/
√
T + k
θ[k]
=
k − 1
1/
√
T + k
θ¯[k] +
1/
√
T + 1
1/
√
T + k
θ[k]. (8)
Algorithm 2 summarizes the proposed ML algorithm with
distributed private datasets using DP sub-gradients with the
additional averaging step as per equation (8). Now, we are
ready to analyze the performance our privacy-preserving ML
training algorithms.
III. PREDICTING THE PERFORMANCE OF ML ON
DISTRIBUTED PRIVATE DATA
For Algorithm 1, we can prove the following convergence
result under the assumptions of differentiability, smoothness,
and strong convexity of the ML fitness function.
Theorem 2. Assume that f is a L-strongly convex
continuously-differentiable function with λ-Lipschitz gradient
and θmax = ∞ (i.e., there is no constraint). For any ε > 0,
there exists a large enough T such that the iterates of
Algorithm 1 satisfy
min
1≤k≤T
E{f(θ[k])} − f(θ∗) ≤8Ξ
2ρ
Ln2
(∑
ℓ∈N
1
ǫ2ℓ
)
+ ε, (9)
and
min
1≤k≤T
E{‖θ[k]− θ∗‖22} ≤
32Ξ2ρ
L2n2
(∑
ℓ∈N
1
ǫ2ℓ
)
+
ε
4L
. (10)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 2 establishes the convergence of Algorithm 1 for
smooth strongly convex functions. This quantifies the trade-off
between privacy and utility by capturing the closeness to the
trained ML model with and without taking into account the
privacy constraints of the data owners. In fact, the inequalities
in (9) and (10) enable us to predict the outcome of a potential
collaboration among privacy-aware data owners (or data cus-
todians) in terms of the fitness cost of the ML training model
prior to executing potentially computationally-expensive ML
algorithms on distributed privately-owned datasets.
To relax the conditions required for convergence of the ML
training, we can use Algorithm 2. In this case, we do not
even need the fitness function to be differentiable because the
algorithm uses sub-gradients, rather than gradients. For the
noisy projected sub-gradient decent algorithm in Algorithm 2,
the following result can be proved.
Theorem 3. For any T , there exists large enough constants3
c1, c2 > 0 such that the iterates of Algorithm 2 satisfy
E{f(θ¯[T ])} − f(θ∗) ≤ c2Ξ
n
√∑
ℓ∈N
1
ǫ2ℓ
, (11)
Further, if g1 is a L-strongly convex function,
E
{∥∥θ¯[T ]− θ∗∥∥2
2
}
≤ 4c2Ξ
Ln
√∑
ℓ∈N
1
ǫ2ℓ
. (12)
Proof. See Appendix C.
The upper bounds on the performance of the training Algo-
rithms 1 and 2 in Theorems 2 and 3 are increasing functions of
(1/n2)
∑
ℓ∈N 1/(ǫℓ)
2 and (1/n)[
∑
ℓ∈N 1/(ǫℓ)
2]1/2, respec-
tively. By increasing ǫℓ, i.e., relaxing the privacy guarantees
of data owners, the performance of the ML training algorithm
improves, as expected because of having access to better
quality gradient oracles.
Remark 2 (Comparison with Central Bounds). Under the
assumption that all the data owners have equal privacy
budgets ǫi = ǫ, ∀i, the bound in (9) scales as ǫ−2 and the
bound in (11) scales as ǫ−1. These bounds are in line with
the lower and the upper bounds in [33] for strongly convex
and general convex loss functions. The same outcome also
3Note that the constants in the statement of the theorem can be functions
of T and, therefore, the bounds in (11) and (12) are useful for comparing
the variations in the performance of the sub-gradient descent algorithm for
various privacy budgets and sizes of the datasets as long as T is fixed.
holds if N = 1 and ǫ1 = ǫ, which is the case of centralized
privacy-preserving learning.
Finally, we note that these results provide bounds on the
distance between the non-private ML model and the privacy-
preserving ML models learned in a distributed manner as a
function of the privacy budgets and the size of the datasets.
Issues, such as non-independent and non-identical datasets, in-
fluence the performance of the non-private model and thus also
indirectly influence the performance of the privacy-preserving
models. In the next section, although the datasets are not
restricted be i.i.d. (e.g., the number of fraudulent transactions
in the credit card fraud detection is low and arguably contains
activities that have originated from same/similar fraudsters),
the theoretical bounds tightly match the experimental results.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION OF THE PERFORMANCE
OF ML ON DISTRIBUTED PRIVATE DATA
In this section, we examine the results of the paper, specifi-
cally the performance of Algorithm 2, on two financial datasets
on lending and credit card fraud. Particularly, we use the
relative fitness of the iterates in Algorithm 2 to illustrate its
performance. The relative fitness of θ is given by
ψ(θ) :=
f(θ)
f(θ∗)
− 1. (13)
This measure shows how good θ is in comparison to the
optimal ML model θ∗ in terms of the training cost in (1).
We opt for studying the relative fitness, scaled by f(θ∗) as
opposed as the absolute fitness f(θ) − f(θ∗), because we
consider datasets with different sizes for two distinct ML
learning models and thus we want to factor out the effects
of the variations of f(θ∗). Finally, note that, by construction,
ψ(θ) ≥ 0. Further, the lower the value of ψ(θ), the better
θ performs in comparison to θ∗. In what follows, we use
Algorithm 1 with ǫ = +∞ for non-private learning of θ∗; this
is equivalent to setting the magnitude of the additive privacy-
preserving noise in the gradients to zero.
A. Lending Dataset
First, we use a lending dataset with a linear regression model
to demonstrate the value of the methodology and to validate
the theoretical results.
1) Dataset Description: The dataset contains information
regarding nearly 890,000 loans made on a peer-to-peer lending
platform, called the Lending Club, which is available on
Kaggle [3]. The inputs contain loan attributes, such as total
loan size, and borrower information, such as number of credit
lines, state of residence, and age. The outputs are the interest
rates of the loans per annum. We encode categorical attributes,
such as state of residence and loan grade assigned by the Loan
Club, with integer numbers. We also remove unique identifier
attributes, such as id and member id, as well as irrelevant
attributes, such as the uniform resource locator (URL) for the
Loan Club page with listing data. Finally, we perform feature
selection using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to
select the top ten important features. This step massively
improves the numerical stability of the algorithm. For the PCA,
we only use the last ten-thousand entries of the dataset to
ensure that the feature selection does not violate the distributed
nature of the algorithm. Note that, if we were to use the
entire dataset for the PCA, the data should have been available
at one location for processing which is contradictory to the
assumptions of the paper regarding the distributed nature of the
dataset and the privacy requirements of the data owners. After
performing the PCA, the eigenvectors corresponding to the
most important features are communicated to the distributed
datasets. The first n1 entries of the Lending Club are assumed
to be the private data of the first data owner. The entries
between n1 + 1 to n1 + n2 belong to the second data owner
and the entries between n1 + n2 + 1 to n1 + n2 + n3 are
with the third data owner. Note that, by construct, these
distributed datasets are non-overlapping, i.e., they do not share
identical records. We may use any other approach for splitting
the Lending Club dataset among the private data owners as
long as the distributed datasets are not overlapping. The data
owners then balance their datasets using the-said eigenvectors.
The balancing refers to a transformation of the dataset using
the eigenvectors to extract the most important independent
features. The eigenvectors, here, serve as a common dictionary
between the data owners for communication and training.
2) Experiment Setup: The experiments demonstrate the
outcome of collaborations among N = 3 financial institutes,
e.g., banks, for training a ML model to automate the process
of assigning interest rates to loan applications based on the
attributes of the borrower and the loan. Each institute has
access to a private dataset of ni historical loan applications
and approved interest rates. The value of ǫi for each insti-
tute essentially determines eagerness for collaboration and
openness to sharing private proprietary datasets. For a linear
regression model, we consider a linear ML model relating
the inputs and the outputs as in y = M(x; θ) := θ⊤x with
θ ∈ Rpθ denoting the parameters of the ML model. We
train the model by solving the optimization problem (1) with
g2(M(x; θ), y) = ‖y −M(x; θ)‖22, and g1(θ) = 0.
3) Results: First, we demonstrate the behaviour (e.g., con-
vergence) of the iterates of the stochastic gradient descent
procedure in Algorithm 2. Consider the case where n1 = n2 =
n3 = 250, 000. Figure 2 shows the statistics of the relative
fitness of the stochastic gradient method in Algorithm 2 for a
ML model determining lending interest rates, ψ(θ¯[k]), versus
the iteration number k for T = 100 for three choices of privacy
budgets ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 to illustrate the convergence of the
learning algorithm as established in Theorem 3. The algorithm
is stochastic because the data owners provide differentially-
private responses to the gradient queries, obfuscated with
Laplace noise in Theorem 1. Thus each run of the algorithm
follows a different relative fitness trend. The boxes, i.e., the
vertical lines at each iterations, illustrate the range of 25%
to 75% percentiles of the relative fitness extracted from one-
hundred runs of the algorithm. The black lines show the
median relative fitness versus the iteration number. The effect
of the privacy budgets on the quality of the iterates at the
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Fig. 2. Statistics of relative fitness of the stochastic gradient method in Algorithm 2 for learning lending interest rates versus the iteration number for
T = 100 with various choices of privacy budgets. The boxes, i.e., the vertical lines at each iterations, illustrate the range of 25% to 75% percentiles for
extracted from a hundred runs of the algorithm and the black lines show the median relative fitness.
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Fig. 3. Relative fitness of the stochastic gradient method in Algorithm 2 for
learning lending interest rates after T = 100 iterations versus the size of the
datasets and the privacy budgets.
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Fig. 4. Relative fitness of the stochastic gradient method in Algorithm 2
for learning lending interest rates after T = 100 iterations versus the privacy
budgets. The solid line illustrate the bound in Theorem 2.
end of T iterations is evident, as expected from Theorem 3.
As ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 increases, i.e., the data owners become
more willing to share data, the performance of the trained
ML model improves. For instance, by increasing the privacy
budget from ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 = 1 to ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 = 10, the
relative fitness of the algorithm improves (i.e., decreases), on
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Fig. 5. Relative fitness of the stochastic gradient method in Algorithm 2 for
learning lending interest rates after T = 100 iterations versus the size of the
datasets. The solid line illustrate the bound in Theorem 2.
average, by approximately 100-fold.
After establishing the desired transient behaviour of the
algorithm, we can investigate the effect of the size of the
datasets and the privacy budgets on the performance of the
trained ML model, i.e., the ML model after all the iterations
have passed. Figure 3 shows the expectation (i.e., the statistical
mean) of the relative fitness of the stochastic gradient method
in Algorithm 2 for the trained ML model after T = 100
iterations versus the size of the datasets n1 = n2 = n3
and the privacy budgets ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3. As predicted by
Theorem 3, the fitness improves as the size of the datasets
n1 = n2 = n3 and/or the privacy budgets ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3
increase. To quantify the tightness of the upper-bound in
Theorem 3 for Algorithm 2, we isolate the effects of the size
of the datasets and the privacy budgets on the relative fitness.
Figure 4 illustrates the expectation of the relative fitness of
the stochastic gradient method in Algorithm 2 after T = 100
iterations versus the privacy budgets ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3. In this
figure, the markers (i.e., , , and ) are from the experiments
and the solid lines are fitted to the experimental data. We can
see that the slope of the linear lines in the log-log scale in
Figure 4 is −2. This shows that ψ(θ¯[k]) ∝ ǫ−2i . Hence, our
Scenario 1: Scenario 2: Scenario 3: Scenario 4:
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Fig. 6. Relative fitness of the stochastic gradient method in Algorithm 2 for learning lending interest rates after T = 100 iterations versus the size of the
dataset and the privacy budget of the first data owner for four distinct scenarios of collaboration.
ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 = 0.1 ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 = 1.0 ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 = 10
PSfrag replacements
100 101 10210
−
2
10
−
1
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
3
k
ψ
(θ¯
[k
]) PSfrag replacements
100 101 10210
−
2
10
−
1
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
3
k
ψ
(θ¯
[k
]) PSfrag replacements
100 101 10210
−
2
10
−
1
10
0
10
1
10
2
10
3
k
ψ
(θ¯
[k
])
Fig. 7. Statistics of relative fitness of the stochastic gradient method in Algorithm 2 for fraud detection versus the iteration number for T = 100 with various
choices of privacy budgets. The boxes, i.e., the vertical lines at each iterations, illustrate the range of 25% to 75% percentiles for extracted from a hundred
runs of the algorithm and the black lines show the median relative fitness.
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Fig. 8. Relative fitness of the stochastic gradient method in Algorithm 2 for
fraud detection after T = 100 iterations versus the size of the datasets and
the privacy budgets.
bound in Theorem 3 is not tight as it states that ψ(θ¯[k]) is
upper bounded by a function of the form ǫ−1i . This is because
Theorem 3 does not use the fact that the cost function for
the regression is strongly convex and has Lipschitz gradients.
These assumptions are utilized in Theorem 2 and the bounds
in this theorem are in fact tight, as Theorem 2 states that
ψ(θ¯[k]) is upper bounded by a function of the form ǫ−2i .
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Fig. 9. Relative fitness of the stochastic gradient method in Algorithm 2 for
fraud detection after T = 100 iterations versus the privacy budgets. The solid
line illustrate the bound in Theorem 2.
Figure 5 shows the expectation of the relative fitness of the
stochastic gradient method in Algorithm 2 after T = 100
iterations versus the size of the datasets n1 = n2 = n3.
Similarly, the slop of the linear lines in the log-log scale in
Figure 5 is −2 pointing to that ψ(θ¯[k]) ∝ n−2i . This is again a
perfect match for our theoretical bound in Theorem 2 (because
n = n1 + n2 + n3 = 3ni).
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Fig. 10. Relative fitness of the stochastic gradient method in Algorithm 2 for
fraud detection after T = 100 iterations versus the size of the datasets. The
solid line illustrate the bound in Theorem 2.
Finally, we consider a few scenarios of collaboration for
the data owners. Specifically, we evaluate the performance of
the learning algorithm for four distinct scenarios in which the
second and the third data owners have: (i) small datasets and
small privacy budgets (i.e., reluctant to share due to privacy
concerns); (ii) small datasets and large privacy budgets (i.e.,
eager to share); (iii) large datasets and small privacy budgets;
(iv) large datasets and large privacy budgets. For each case, we
vary the privacy budget and the size of the dataset of the first
data owner. This allows us to investigate the potential benefit to
data owners from collaboration in various scenarios. Figure 6
illustrates the expectation of the relative fitness of the stochas-
tic gradient method in Algorithm 2, after T = 100 iterations,
versus the size of the dataset n1 and the privacy budget ǫ1 for
four distinct scenarios of collaboration. The first scenario in
Figure 6 (the left most plot) shows that there is no point in
collaboration with small data owners, even if the size of the
dataset of the first data owner is large and it is eager to share
its data; the relative fitness (capturing the distance between
private ML model and the non-private model) is very large, it
does not change significantly with ǫ1, and it still remains large
for relative large datasets n1 = 10
5. We could foresee this
from the bound in Theorem 3 without running Algorithm 2.
This bound shows that ψ(θ¯[k]) ∝ 1/(2000+n1)
√
200 + 1/ǫ21;
hence, no matter how large ǫ1 gets (even if ǫ1 = ∞), the
error’s coefficient remains large due to small privacy budgets
of the other two data owners and n1 must become considerably
large to compensate for it. In the second scenario (the second
left most plot in Figure 6), the effect of ǫ1 and n1 are more
pronounced. This is because, although the other two data
owners are small, they do not hinder the learning process by
adding large amounts of privacy-preserving noise because of
their conservatively small privacy budgets. The third scenario
is similar to the first one, albeit with better relative fitness as
conservative data owners are relatively larger. The best sce-
nario for collaboration, unsurprisingly, is the fourth scenario in
which phenomenal performances can be achieved even without
much consideration towards the size of the first dataset or its
privacy budget as the other two datasets are large and eager
to collaborate for learning.
B. Credit Card Fraud Detection
In this subsection, we use a credit card dataset with a
L-SVM classifier to further demonstrate the value of the
methodology and to validate the theoretical results.
1) Dataset Description: The datasets contains transactions
made by European credit card holders in September 2013
available on Kaggle [4]. The inputs are vectors extracted by
PCA (to avoid confidentiality issues) as well as the amount
of the transaction. The output is a class, determining if the
transactions was deemed fraudulent or not. The dataset is
highly unbalanced, as the positive class (frauds) account for
0.172% of all transactions.
2) Experiment Setup: The experiments demonstrate the
outcome of collaborations among N = 3 financial institutes
for training a SVM classifier to detect fraudulent activities
automatically and rapidly. Each institute has access to a
private dataset of ni historical credit card transactions and
their authenticity. The value of ǫi for each institute deter-
mines eagerness for collaboration. In L-SVM, the model
is M(x; θ) := θ⊤[x⊤ 1]⊤, and g1(θ) := (1/2)θ
⊤θ and
g2(M(x; θ), y) := max(0, 1−M(x; θ)y).
3) Results: First, we investigate the transient behaviour of
the iterates of Algorithm 2. Assume that n1 = n2 = n3 =
30, 000. Figure 7 shows the statistics of the relative fitness of
the iterates of Algorithm 2 for training a fraud detection SVM
classifier, ψ(θ¯[k]), versus the iteration number k for T = 100
for three choices of privacy budgets ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3. The boxes,
i.e., the vertical lines at each iterations, illustrate the range
of 25% to 75% percentiles of relative fitness extracted from
one-hundred runs of the algorithm and the black lines show
the median relative fitness. As expected from Theorem 3, the
performance of the trained SVM classifier gets closer to the
SVM classifier trained with no privacy constraints θ∗ as the
privacy budgets increases.
Now, we can demonstrate the effect of the size of the
datasets and the privacy budgets on the performance of the
trained SVM classifier at the end of T training iterations.
Figure 8 shows the expectation of the relative fitness of the
stochastic gradient method in Algorithm 2 after T = 100
iterations versus the size of the datasets n1 = n2 = n3 and the
privacy budgets ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3. Similar to the theoretical results
in Theorem 3, the fitness improves by increasing the size of the
datasets n1 = n2 = n3 and the privacy budgets ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3.
We can also isolate the effects of the size of the datasets
and the privacy budgets. Figure 9 illustrates the expectation
of the relative fitness of the iterates of Algorithm 2 after
T = 100 iterations versus the privacy budgets ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3.
As all linear slopes in the log-log scale in Figure 9 are −2,
the bound in Theorem 2 seems to be a perfect fit. Figure 5
shows the expectation of the relative fitness of the iterates of
Algorithm 2 after T = 100 iterations versus the size of the
datasets n1 = n2 = n3 revealing the exact behaviour predicted
in the bound in Theorem 2.
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ǫ2 = ǫ3 = 0.1 ǫ2 = ǫ3 = 10 ǫ2 = ǫ3 = 0.1 ǫ2 = ǫ3 = 10
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Fig. 11. Relative fitness of the stochastic gradient method in Algorithm 2 for a trained ML model determining lending interest rates after T = 100 iterations
versus the size of the dataset and the privacy budget of the first data owner for four distinct scenarios of collaboration.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of the learning algo-
rithm for four distinct scenarios, in which the second and the
third data owners have: (i) small datasets and small privacy
budgets; (ii) small datasets and large privacy budgets; (iii)
large datasets and small privacy budgets; (iv) large datasets
and large privacy budgets. Figure 11 illustrates the expectation
of the relative fitness of Algorithm 2 after T = 100 iterations
versus the size of the dataset n1 and the privacy budget ǫ1 for
four distinct scenarios of collaboration. The first scenario in
Figure 11 (the left most plot) illustrates that there is no point
in collaboration with small data owners even if the size of
the dataset of the first data owner is large and it is eager to
share its data. In the second scenario (the second left most plot
in Figure 11), the effect of ǫ1 and n1 are more pronounced
because the privacy budgets of the second and the third data
owners are large and thus they do not degrade the performance
of the learning algorithm by injecting excessive privacy-
preserving noise. The third scenario is again similar to the first
one, albeit with better results as conservative data owners are
relatively larger. The best scenario for collaboration, similar
to the loan example, is the fourth scenario in which the
training performances with and without privacy constraints are
identical, so long as the dataset of the first subsystem is large,
or its privacy budget is not too small.
V. DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
We considered privacy-aware optimization-based ML on
distributed private datasets. We assumed that the data owners
provide DP responses to gradient queries. The theoretical anal-
ysis of the proposed DP gradient descent algorithms provided
a way for predicting the quality of ML models based on the
privacy budgets and the size of the datasets. We proved that
the difference between the training model with and without
considering privacy constrains of the data owners is bounded
by (
∑
ℓ∈N nℓ)
−2
∑
ℓ∈N ǫ
−2
ℓ in our proposed algorithms under
smoothness and strong-convexity assumptions for the fitness
cost. The empirical results with real-world financial datasets
split between multiple institutes/banks while using regression
and support vector machine models demonstrated that the
relative fitness in fact follows ǫ−2i and n
−2
i for the proposed
algorithm. This shows the tightness of the upper bounds on the
difference between the trained ML models with and without
privacy constraints from the theoretical analysis, which can
be utilized for quantification of the privacy-utility trade-off in
privacy-preserving ML.
Note that the data owners, themselves, can also play the
role of the learner in Figure 1. In this case, the data owner
who is interested in learning a model can query the other data
owners to provide DP gradients to use for learning. Now, in
this case, as the other data owners cannot access the trained
model or the query responses, the data owner who is training
the model can set its own privacy budget to infinity. Following
this approach, by creating N copies of the algorithm discussed
in this paper, we can remove the central learner and each data
owner can learn its own ML model.
The results of this paper can be used or extended in multiple
directions for future research:
• We can extend the framework to multiple learners aiming
to train separate privacy-aware ML models with similar
structures based on their own datasets and DP responses
from other learners and private data owners. This is closer
in nature to the distributed or federated ML framework
over an arbitrary connected communication network.
Note that, in this paper, the communication structure
among the learner and the data owners is over a star
graph with the learner at the center.
• The results of this paper can be used to understand the
behaviour of data owners and learners in a data market for
ML training. The utility-privacy trade-off in this paper,
in terms of the quality of the trained ML models, can be
used in conjunction with the cost of sharing private data
of costumers with the learner (in terms of loss of repu-
tation, legal costs, implementation of privacy-preserving
mechanisms, and communication infrastructure) to setup
a game-theoretic framework for modeling interactions
across a data market. The learner can compensate the
data owners for access to their private data, by essentially
paying them for choosing larger privacy budgets. After
negotiations between the data owners and the learners for
setting the privacy budgets, the algorithm of this paper
can be used to then train ML models, while knowing in
advance the expected quality of the trained model.
• Synchronous updates of the algorithm is indeed a bottle-
neck of the proposed algorithm. Future work can focus
on extending the results of this paper to asynchronous
gradient updates where, at each iteration, only a subset
of the data owners update the ML model. To be able to
ensure the convergence of the asynchronous algorithm,
we need to ensure that all the data owners update the
model as frequently as required.
• Another direction for future research is to extend the
framework of this paper to adversarial learning scenarios
that can admit more general adversaries (than the case of
curious-but-honest adversaries in this paper).
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
First, because of (6), we have
‖Qℓ(Dℓ; k)−Qℓ(D′ℓ; k))‖1 =
1
nℓ
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
{x,y}∈Dℓ
ξg¯x,y
2
(θ[k])
−
∑
{x,y}∈D′
ℓ
ξg¯x,y
2
(θ[k])
∥∥∥∥∥
1
=
1
nℓ
‖ξg¯x,y
2
(θ[k])|{x,y}∈Dℓ⊆D′ℓ
−ξg¯x,y
2
(θ[k])|{x,y}∈D′
ℓ
⊆Dℓ‖1.
This implies that ‖Qℓ(Dℓ; k) − Qℓ(D′ℓ; k))‖1 ≤
(2/nℓ)max{x,y}∈D′
ℓ
⊆Dℓ∪Dℓ⊆D′ℓ
‖ξg¯x,y
2
(θ[k])‖1 ≤ 2Ξ/nℓ,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 3. Noting
the exponential form of the Laplace random variable, we get
p((Qℓ(Dℓ; k))Tk=1)
p((Qℓ(D′ℓ; k))Tk=1)
=
T∏
k=1
exp
(
‖Qℓ(D′ℓ; k)‖1
b
−‖Qℓ(Dℓ; k)‖1
b
)
≤
T∏
k=1
exp(2Ξ/bnℓ)
= exp(2ΞT/bnℓ),
where, by some abuse of notation, p(·) denotes the prob-
ability density of the variable in its argument. Substituting
b = 2ΞT/(nℓǫℓ) in this inequality concludes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The magnitude of the DP noise is
E{‖w[k]‖22} =E
{∥∥∥∥
(
1∑
ℓ∈N nj
)∑
j∈N
nℓwℓ[k]
∥∥∥∥
2
2
}
=
(
1∑
ℓ∈N nj
)2 ∑
ℓ∈N
n2ℓE{‖wℓ[k]‖22}
=
(
1∑
ℓ∈N nj
)2 ∑
ℓ∈N
8Ξ2T 2
ǫ2ℓ
=
8Ξ2T 2
n2
∑
ℓ∈N
1
ǫ2ℓ
.
Because ∇f is λ-Lipschitz, f(z1) ≤ f(z2) +∇f(z2)⊤(z1 −
z2) + 0.5λ‖z2 − z1‖22 for all z1, z2 [34] and therefore
E{f(θ[k + 1])} ≤E{f(θ[k])}
+ E{∇f(θ[k])⊤(θ[k + 1]− θ[k])}
+
λ
2
E{‖θ[k + 1]− θ[k]‖22}
≤E{f(θ[k])}
+ ρk
(
λρk
2
− 1
)
E{‖∇f(θ[k])‖22}
+ ρ2k
8Ξ2T 2
n2
∑
ℓ∈N
1
ǫ2ℓ
.
For all ρk ≤ 1/λ, we have
E{f(θ[k + 1])} ≤E{f(θ[k])} − ρk
2
E{‖∇f(θ[k])‖22}
+ ρ2k
8Ξ2T 2
n2
∑
ℓ∈N
1
ǫ2ℓ
. (14)
For ε > 0, we may define
k0 := inf
k
{
k
∣∣∣∣E{‖∇f(θ[k])‖22} ≤ 16Ξ2T 2ρkn2
∑
ℓ∈N
1
ǫ2ℓ
+ ε
}
.
Here, k0 is the iteration number at which the magnitude of
the last term in the right hand side of (14) (a positive value)
becomes larger than the magnitude of the second to the last
term in the right hand side of (14) (a negative value). In
essence, at k0, the upper bound on the cost function does not
reduce. If T is large enough, we can easily show that there
exists k0 <∞. This can be proved by contrapositive. Assume
that this not the case. Therefore,
lim
k→0
E{f(θ[k])} =E{f(θ[1])}
+
k∑
t=2
(E{f(θ[t])} − E{f(θ[t− 1])})
≤E{f(θ[1])} −
k∑
t=2
ερk
=−∞.
This is however not possible. Since f is L-strongly convex,
Polyak-Lojasiewicz inequality [34] implies that
E{f(θ[k0])} − f(θ∗) ≤ 1
2L
E{‖∇f(θ[k])‖22}
≤8Ξ
2T 2ρk
Ln2
∑
ℓ∈N
1
ǫ2ℓ
+
ε
2L
.
Now, because k0 ≤ T , we get
min
1≤k≤T
E{f(θ[k])} − f(θ∗) ≤E{f(θ[k0])} − f(θ∗)
≤8Ξ
2T 2ρk
Ln2
∑
ℓ∈N
1
ǫ2ℓ
+
ε
2L
.
Again, because f is L-strongly convex, we can see that
f(θ∗) ≤ f(tθ + (1− t)θ∗)
≤ tf(θ) + (1− t)f(θ∗)− L
2
t(t− 1)∥∥θ − θ∗∥∥2
2
,
for all t ∈ (0, 1). Setting t = 1/2 results in∥∥θ − θ∗∥∥2
2
≤ 4(f(θ)− f(θ∗))/L. (15)
Hence,
min
1≤k≤T
‖θ[k]− θ∗‖22 ≤
4
L
(
min
1≤k≤T
E{f(θ[k])} − f(θ∗)
)
≤32Ξ
2T 2ρk
L2n2
∑
ℓ∈N
1
ǫ2ℓ
+
ε
8L2
.
This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The proof for this theorem follows from modification of the
results of [2]. In fact, the inequality in (11) follows from the
result of [2] using the optimal selection of c in [29]. The only
difference with the proofs in [2] is to appreciate that
ζk − ζk−1 ≤ 2√
TT (T + 1)
,
where
ζk :=
1/
√
T + 1
1/
√
T + k
T∏
m=k+1
m− 1
1/
√
T +m
.
The inequality follows from that
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√
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√
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×
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√
T )(1/
√
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×
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√
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m
(1/
√
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≤ 2√
T
1
T (T + 1)
.
If f is L-strongly convex, the proof of the inequality in (12)
follows from (15).
